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Abstract
This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits
in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral
institutions. Prominent political scientists are increasingly rejecting the
countermajoritarian difficulty as the proper framework for studying and
evaluating judicial power. Political scientists, who study Congress and
the presidency, however, have recently emphasized countermajoritarian difficulties with electoral institutions, Realistic normative appraisals
of American political institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains, should begin by postulating a set of democratic and constitutional goods, determine the extent to
which American institutions as a whole are delivering those goods, and
either explain how the political system as a whole might be redesigned
to better deliver those goods or accept second-best constitutional goods
that can actually be delivered by some attainable combination of political institutions,

The countermajoritarian
difficulty is emigrating from the judiciary to the elected branches
of government. Alexander Bickel, the Yale Law
professor who coined the phrase countermajoritarian difficulty, regarded judicial review as
"a deviant institution in the American democracy" (Bickel 1962, p. 18). Policy choices, he
and other legal scholars of his generation proclaimed, were best made by elected officials who
were politically accountable and more likely to
reflect public sentiment than were unelected
justices (see, e.g., Ely 1980). The titles of the
books in the Institutions of American Democracy series sponsored by the Annenberg Foundation Trust challenge this consensus. Rosen's
(2006) study, The Most Democratic Branch: How
the Courts Serve America, celebrates the judicial capacity to reflect public opinion. "[T]he
Supreme Court," he writes, "has followed the
public's views about constitutional
questions
throughout
its history" (p. 185). Rosen's historical survey finds that "un elected Supreme
Court justices sometimes express the views
of popular majorities more faithfully than the
people's elected representatives"
(Rosen 2006,
p. 4). Mann & Ornstein's (2006) work, The B7'0ken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and
How to Get It Back on Track, suggests that the nationallegislature
is the new "deviant institution
in the American democracy." They complain
about "the transformation
of intense partisanship into virtually tribal politics," a "decline in
accountability," "a decline in congressional deliberation and a de facto delegation of authority
and influence to the president" (pp. x, 12). The
result is a governing process that is not democratically sustainable. As Mann & Ornstein
(2006, p. 13) conclude, the "country and its
enduring constitutional
pact should not, and
cannot, endure a broken branch for long."
This review documents how scholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism
has shifted from the courts to
electoral institutions. The first section examines the increased tendency for political scientists to reject the countermajoritarian
difficulty
as the proper framework for studying and evaluating judicial power. Whittington
(2007) in362
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sists that judicial supremacy is politically constructed by presidents who, more often than
not, have reasons to empower courts as allies
in their struggles against political rivals in the
states, in Congress, and in their political party.
Frymer (2007) discusses how judicial power was
politically constructed by New Deal liberals eager to avoid taking responsibility for adjudicating clashes between labor and persons of color.
Both Whittington
and Frymer find politically
constructed judicial review problematic, but not
out of concerns with democratic majoritarianism. The second major section of the review
documents the increased tendency for political scientists to emphasize countermajoritarian
difficulties with electoral institutions. Hacker &
Pierson (2006) describe how political conservatives in a polarized polity are able to pass and
maintain regulatory programs that lack broad
popular support. Lee & Oppenheimer
(1999)
explain why equal state representation
in the
Senate promotes undemocratic
public policies
that substantially overvalue the interests and
values of small-state citizens. Such contemporary constitutional
critics as Dahl (2001) and
Levinson (2006) spend far more energy criticizing the majoritarian failings of Article I, Article
II, and Article V than the democratic problems
with life-tenured justices armed with the power
to declare laws unconstitutional.
All the works surveyed abandon the subtle formalism underlying
Alexander Bickel's
original formulation of the countermajoritarian
problem. Bickel (1962) insisted that elected officials should make political decisions because
elected officials were politically accountable.
Procedurally fair elections, his work indicated,
were both the necessary and sufficient condition
for democratic legitimacy (Bickel 1962, p. 33).
Contemporary
scholars of American politics
recognize that political accountability is as determined by constitutional politics as constitutional forms. Works subtitled The Declining Importance of Elections (Ginsberg & Shefter 1990)
detail how procedurally fair elections are often
not sufficient to give citizens adequate control
over policymaking. Elections do not promote
accountability, Hacker & Pierson (2006, p. 217)

explain, when voters are poorly informed or are
not offered candidates committed to their values and interests. Litigation may promote accountability, Frymer (2007, p. 130) maintains,
when courts provide de facto representation to
political interests that elected officials have no
incentive to accommodate.
This scholarship on the political foundations
of judicial power, the baneful consequences of
polarization on public policy, and the democratic deficits hard wired into the Constitution
is generating a more systemic understanding of
the counterrnajoritarian difficulty and constitutionalism in the United States. Commentators
whose work was s ructured by Bickel's countermajoritarian problem isolated the Supreme
Court from the rest of American politics, focused entirely on whether particular judicial
decisions passed democratic muster, limited
analysis to legal issues adjudicated by federal
courts, and commented on only one dimension, majoritarianism, of democratic government. The works surveyed in this review observe that apparent democratic deficits in one
institution may be consequences of democratic
deficits in other institutions, explore how all
American institutions respond to constitutional
questions, elaborate how constitutional practices structure

the ways political institutions

make public policies, and suggest how judicial
review may alleviate or aggravate coherence,
polarization, bias, and accountability difficulties. Whittington, Frymer, Hacker & Pierson,
Lee & Oppenheimer, and Levinson agree that
the crucial constitutional question is whether
the political system as a whole exhibits certain virtues, not whether a particular output or
institution, standing alone, passes a particular
democratic or constitutional standard. Realistic normative appraisals of American political
institutions, this emerging literature on constitutional politics in the United States maintains,
should begin by postulating a set of democratic
and constitutional goods, determine the extent
to which American institutions as a whole are
delivering those goods, and either explain how
the political system as a whole might be redesigned to better deliver those goods or ac-

cept second-best constitutional goods that can
actually be delivered by some attainable combination of political institutions.

THE COUNTERMA]ORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY REVILED
The contemporary countermajoritarian
difficulty largely dates from the publication of
Bickel's (1962) The Least Dangerous Branch: The
Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. In that
work, Bickel famously declared that "when the
Supreme Court declares a law unconstitutional,
it thwarts the will of the representatives of the
people of the here and now" (pp. 16-17). Although he declared that "this is what realistically occur]s]" (p. 17), Bickel later acknowledged that elected officials might approve of
some judicial policymaking. What national officials thought about judicial decisions declaring
state laws unconstitutional, in particular, was often unclear (Bickel 1962, p. 33). Nevertheless,
Bickel (1962, p. 18) insisted, judicial review was
a "deviant institution in a democratic society."
The countermajoritarian
problem, in his view
(p. 33), was as much rooted in claims that policy
ought to be controlled by elected officials as in
claims that a majority of elected officials might
not approve of judicial decisions.
Much political science wisdom for the past
generation challenges the countermajoritarian perception of the relationship between
justices and elected officials. The seminal
works in this literature include Whittington
(2007,2005), Gillman (2006, 2002), Pickerill &
Clayton (2004), Clayton & May (1999), Lovell
(2003), Frymer (2003, 2007), McMahon (2004),
Hirschi (2004), Ginsburg (2003), Sweet (2000),
Graber (1993), Lasser (1988), and Dahl (1957).
Several prominent law professors began working within and developing this new paradigm.
They include Powe (2000), Balkin & Levinson
(2001), Friedman (1993,2005), Griffin (1996),
Tushnet (2006,2005), and Klarman (2004). Important forthcoming works include Silverstein
(2009), Clayton & Pickerill (2009), Friedman
(2009), and McMahon (2008). Students of public law committed to regime politics theory
www.ll111l11f1h-eviews.org
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(Pickerill & Clayton 2004) or the political construction of judicial power (Whittington
2007)

ten shifting, subset of the lawmaking elite supports particular judicial decisions or the trend

explore why elected officials create, expand, or
at least maintain the judicial authority to declare
laws unconstitutional.
Empirical investigation
and positive analysis reveal that members of
the dominant national coalition often promote
their electoral prospects or preferred policies
by supporting both judicial review and judicial
supremacy. Justices impose majoritarian policies on outlier states, provide insurance when
dominant coalitions suffer electoral defeats, en-

of judicial decision making. The judicial power
to declare laws unconstitutional
often privileges

able elected officials to avoid taking firm stands
on hotly contested political issues, provide a
policymaking alternative when elected institutions are gridlocked, resolve issues lacking the
political salience necessary to attract legislative attention, and facilitate position taking by
announcing policies that crucial elites support
but cannot publicly endorse. Elected officials
sponsor judicial review by establishing and expanding federal jurisdiction, by nominating and
confirming justices known to be willing to declare laws unconstitutional,
by easing access to
courts and providing resources to litigants who
are making constitutional attacks on courts, by
adopting procedures that enable litigants to discover and prove constitutional
violations, by
adopting vague statutory language that must be
interpreted by courts, and by refusing to pass
anticourt legislation in response to public attacks on courts.
Dahl's (1957, p. 291) claim that "it would
appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members
are recruited in the fashion of Supreme Court
Justices would long hold to norms of Right or
Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the
political elite" states the central principle underlying this new conception of judicial power
in a constitutional
democracy. Neither Dahl
nor any other scholar elaborating regime politics theory asserts that Supreme Court decisions perfectly reflect the platform of the political party that has won the most recent elections
or that justices consistently select the policy favored by most citizens or politically influential
actors. The argument is that at least some, of-

some members of the present lawmaking majority at the expense of others. Justices, for example, tend to support claims made by members of
the presidential wing of the dominant national
coalition when constitutional disputes arise between the executive and legislative branches of
the national government
(Whittington
2007,
p. 295; Graber 2006a, p. 691). What courts
hardly ever do is protect powerless minorities that have no champions among the powerholding majority.
During the first part of the present decade,
several younger political scientists wrote important first books documenting
the political
construction
of judicial power (Graber 2005
discusses these works at length). Lovell (2003)
detailed how antiunion decisions handed down
by the Supreme Court during the first third
of the twentieth century were consequences of
legislative compromises that facilitated judicial
policymaking in the guise of statutory interpretation. McMahon (2004) explored how members of the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower
administrations paved the way to Brown v. Board
of Education (1954) by packing the federal courts
with racial liberals and sponsoring litigation
challenging Jim Crow policies. Comparative
law scholars demonstrated
that the political
construction
of judicial review was a worldwide phenomenon
that had similar causes and
raised similar concerns as judicial empowerment in the United States. Elected officials on
every major continent, researchers found, were
responsible for instigating and maintaining a
"global expansion of judicial power" (Tate &
Vallinder 1995). HirschI (2004) detailed how
constitutional
politics in new constitutional
societies were driven more by elites seeking
to preserve power than by altruistic concerns
with the rights of the poor and disadvantaged.
Ginsburg (2003) documented how judicial review in new democracies was conceptualized as
a form of insurance for existing elites, rather
than as a check on their power.

These

studies

of judicial

power

in the

United States and abroad repeatedly emphasized how judicial power fed on political fragmentation. The more diffuse political power,
the more likely courts resolved and were invited to resolve important constitutional issues. "[Pjolitical diffusion is good for judicial
power," Ginsburg's (2003, p. 261) analysis of
judicialization in Mongolia, Taiwan, and South
Korea noted. He observed how "[pjolitical diffusion creates more disputes for courts to resolve and hinders authorities from overruling
or counterattacking courts." Judicial review survived in the United States in part because fissures within the Jeffersonian coalition inhibited
attacks on the Federalist-dominated
judiciary
(Ellis 1971). The American Supreme Court decided such cases as Roe v. Wade (1973) and Dred
Scott v. Sandford (1856) in part because abortion and slavery raised cross-cutting issues that
could not be resolved within the existing party
system (Graber 1993).
Two important books by more senior scholars extend and significantly enrich the political regimes model of the interaction between justices and elected officials. Both
Whittington
(2007) and Frymer (2007) take
the political construction of judicial power for
granted. "For constitutions and institutions like
judicial review to exist in historical reality,"
Whittington (2007, p. 4) states, "there must
be political reasons for powerful political actors to support them over time." Neither author regards the countermajoritarian
difficulty
as having much explana tory power or norma tive
force. Whittington
meticulously details how
presidential ambitions and political fragmentation have promoted the growth of judicial
power in the United States. Although a few
presidents have had political incentives to attack courts, presidents more often seek judicial
support in their struggles to overcome the political fragmentation of American society. "Federalism, separation of powers, and the particular structure of the American party system,"
Whittington (2007, p. 289) states, "have played
key roles in encouraging presidents to lend their
support to the courts." Frymer (2007) painstak-

ingly describes how legislative choices and political fragmentation help explain the judicial
decisions that desegregated labor unions. Liberals during the 1950s and 1960s, eager to avoid
responsibility for mediating tensions between
white workers and the civil rights movement,
doled out responsibility for adjudicating debates over employment relations to administration agencies and responsibility for adjudicating racial issues to the federal courts. The
resulting "patchwork state" (Skowronek 1982,
pp. 45-46) has significant failures, but none is
adequately captured by the countermajoritarian
difficulty.

PoUticalFoundations
of Judicial Supremacy
Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The
Presidency, the Supreme Court and Constitutional
Leadership in
History is the rare work

u.s.

likely to be considered
at least three important
agendas in law, political
Whittington
(2007) in

a seminal study for
and growing research
science, and history.
less then 300 pages

brings conceptual order to the burgeoning literature on the Constitution
outside of the
court, identifies crucial patterns in the political construction of judicial review, and brilliantly elucidates the growth of judicial power
in the United States. Much previous scholarship (Burgess 1992, Curtis 2000, Devins 1996,
Dinan 1998, Fisher 1988, Friedman 1993,
Levinson 1988) had detailed how other political actors often engaged in constitutional interpretation, sometimes challenging (Agresto
1984, Kramer 2004) and sometimes buttressing (Graber 1993, Lovell 2003) judicial authority. Friedman's (1998, 2000, 2001, 2002a,b)
magnificent work on the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty chronicles the nature
of political opposition and support for judicial
power throughout American history. Friedman
aside, that past work treated as episodic presidential assertions of constitutional authority or
political invitations for courts to make constitutional policy. Commentators noted that several presidents had attacked judicial supremacy,
unmu.annualreoiems.orc
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but they failed to explain why some presidents
challenge courts while others ally themselves
with the federal judiciary. History tended to
repeat itself, without any development. Edwin
Meese's (1987) attack on judicial supremacy
was interpreted
as nothing more than a mere
variation on themes first played by Thomas
Jefferson
(1975, pp. 562-63).
Whittington
(2007) offers a far more sophisticated view of
the practice of constitutionalism
outside the
court, judicial supremacy, and the political construction of judicial power. Political Foundations demonstrates that presidents compete with
courts for the authority to determine constitu• tional meanings only in relatively rare historical
circumstances. Presidents in more common political circumstances have substantive incentives
to bolster judicial authority. Whittington (2007,
p. xi) notes that" [dJepartmentalism
has enjoyed
moments of prominence in American constitu-

tutional power between governing institutions
and the proper limits on constitutional power.

I

Reconstructive
presidents typically perceive a
judiciary staffed by holdovers from the previous
regime as their main rival for constitutional authority. Their capacity to transform the political
order requires them to undermine the Supreme
Court's privileged place as a constitutional
interpreter. Whittington
(2007, p. 74) points out,
"As the old regime collapses, the judiciary is
likely to be both a visible defender of the old
order and one that survives electoral turnover."
For this reason, judicial supremacy "is a likely
target for a reconstructive
leader seeking to
dismantle the previous regime." The resulting presidential attacks on the federal judiciary
are as rooted in constitutional conviction as in
political interest. In sharp contrast to critics

tional thought and practice," but his work details how" [pJresidents and political leaders have
generally preferred that the Court take the responsibility for securing constitutional fidelity."
The tools presidents have for engaging in both
practices have changed over time. Nineteenthcentury presidents, working within a relatively
thin institutional environment, could challenge

of departmentalism
(i.e., Alexander & Schauer
1997), who insist that judicial supremacy is necessary because politics is normally unprincipled,
Whittington
(2007) notes that attacks on judicial supremacy in the United States take place
only during those rare historical moments when
issues of constitutional
principle become most
salient politically. In his view, "When the political debate begins to focus on the 'constitutional
baseline'
itself, judicial authority
becomes

judicial pretensions in ways politically unavailable to their twentieth-century
descendants.

more tenuous and other political actors make
stronger claims to interpretive primacy" (p. 22).

The more general presidential tendency to empower courts provides far stronger foundations
for judicial authority at present than Marbury v.
Madison (1803). Paradoxically,
the political
institution
commonly
thought
to be the
best vehicle for a popular constitutionalism,
Whittington's
exceptionally
important
study

Presidents
become attracted
to judicial
power when the role of constitutional
principle in politics wanes. Affiliated presidents,
who seek to maintain the constitutional
vi-

finds, is, in fact, largely responsible for entrenching judicial supremacy in the United
States.
Judicial supremacy in the United States has
been challenged only after reconstructive presidents gain office. These presidents, Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Reagan, have
electoral permission to uproot the previous
constitutional
order. They challenge inherited
understandings of the proper division of consti-

sion of and the political coalition forged by
the most recent reconstructive
president, inherit a sympathetic Court. Whittington
(2007,
p. 87) observes, "Affiliated leaders will expect
to place like-minded judges on the bench and
can expect that earlier affiliated [and reconstructive] leaders did the same." The Supreme
Court had a Jacksonian majority when Martin
\ .•1 Buren
took office. Roosevelt bequeathed

1 Skowronek
(I993) is the classic study of reconstructive,
affiliated, and preemptive presidents, as well as the conception
of political time.

Truman a federal judiciary staffed almost entirely by New Dealers. Such presidents find
empowering their allies on the federal bench a
useful means for "regime elaboration and enforcement" (Whittington
2007, p. 117), particularly "against constitutional
outliers" (p. 105)
in recalcitrant states, "cut] ting] through the leg-

over time weakened considerably as deferential
precedents made by affiliated and preemptive
presidents accumulated.
Whittington
details
how Rooseveltian and Reaganite challenges to
tlle Court were far tamer than nineteenthcentury departmentalist
claims, in large part because there was a greater encrusting of judicial

islative gridlock to achieve
with regime commitments"
"generat[ing] position-taking

supremacy to overcome. Lincoln declared he
would not treat the Dred Scott decision as limiting federal power. Roosev.elt sought only to
secure more favorable judicial decisions. His
"proposal to pack the Court with his supporters," Whittington
(2007, p. 266) correctly

results consistent
(p. 126), and for
opportunities
by

reducing the policy responsibility of the elected
officials" (p. 137). Preemptive presidents, who
do not identify with the most recent reconstructive president, are nevertheless not in a position
to challenge judicial authority. Confronting
a
Congress controlled by political rivals, Grover
Cleveland and William Clinton often found judicial decision making the lesser of two evils. "In
a hostile political environment," Political Fonn-

ing precedential support for judicial power, Political Foundations observes, presidents "reserve

dations (pp. 166-67) points out, "the law and the
judiciary may be the best defense that a president has." Justices who have established precedents favoring executive power when affiliated

the right to complain and cajole, but they do not
claim tile authority to say what tile Constitution
means" (p. 284).
An institution tint routinely promotes pres-

presidents were in office may be less tempted by
short-term benefits to modify those rules during the relatively short interregnum of preemptive rule. Whittington
(2007, p. 169) declares,

idential ambitions is no more countermajoritarian than tile presidency. During the 181 years in
which the United States has been governed by
affiliated or preemptive presidents, members of
the executive department have enthusiastically

"[H]aving embraced broad theories of inherent presidential powers, judges are unlikely to
hedge them simply because they are being exercised by oppositional presidents."
These patterns of presidential assertiveness
and passivity have developed as well as cycled. As politics alternated between reconstructive, affiliated, and preemptive presidents, judicial power in the United States became more
deeply entrenched.
Reconstructive
presidencies rarely occur (Whittington
2007, p. 50),
and they have short windows of opportunity.
Affiliated and preemptive presidencies are far
more common. The resulting ratio of presidents who challenge judicial authority to presidents who support judicial authority has over
time generated legal and political precedents
that increasingly strengthen political assertions
of judicial supremacy while rendering political
challenges to judicial supremacy more difficult.
Presidential challenges to judicial authority

states, "contained no provision requiring judicial restraint at all." The Reagan attack on
courts was limited largely to a few symbolic
speeches. Constrained by tile now overwhelm-

supported the course of judicial policymaking,
aggressively promoted judicial power, or, at a
minimum, preferred judicial decisions to legislative supremacy. Only 5 of the 43 American
presidents have challenged the judicial authority to declare laws unconstitutional,
and their
departrnentalist
assertions did not have a long
shelf life. As reconstructive
presidents transformed tile courts through tile normal appointment process, concerns with judicial supremacy
dissipated. Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt all
abandoned contests for constitutional
authority late in their terms of office. The Supreme
Court has declared neither more laws nor more
important
laws unconstitutional
during reconstructive presidencies. Whittington
(2007,
p. 158) notes, "[J]udges are often [most] activist
when their apparent friends occupy the corridors oflegislative power." This steadily increasing tendency

for presidents

umnu.anmmheoiems.org
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suggests that had the justices refrained from
declaring
laws unconstitutional
throughout
most of American history, that would have been
the course that would have "thwarted the will
of the representative[]
of the people of the here
and now" in the White House. Political Foundations appropriately
concludes, "The American
historical experience shows politicians actively
helping to construct judicial authority. They are
not the victims of judicial supremacy" (p. 290).
The countermajoritarian
difficulty does
not even describe the relationship
between
courts and elected officials in the national gov, ernment when reconstructive
presidents hold
office. Reconstructive presidents challenge the
Supreme Court's authority over constitutional
meaning as part of wide-ranging
efforts to
transform the entire regime. "Conflicts with
the courts," Whittington
(2007, p. 59) states,
"are only a single skirmish within the larger
presidential offensive to establish his authority
to remake American politics." Jackson had to
contend with both the Marshall Court and the
proto-Whigs who controlled at least one house
of Congress from 1828 until 1834. Roosevelt
struggled against both the Nine Old Men
and the southern Democrats who held crucial
levers of power in both houses of Congress
during the 1930s. Jacksonian and New Deal
challenges
to judicial power faltered when
opposition
forces in the national legislature
defeated efforts to reconstruct
the federal
judiciary. Proponents
of the national bank
and protective tariffs in 1831 easily defeated a
southern Jacksonian proposal to abolish federal
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions
interpreting
the federal Constitution
(Warren
1913). Southern
Democrats,
fearing
that
Roosevelt would appoint racial liberals to the
federal bench, helped defeat the Court packing
plan in 1937 (McMahon 2004). This underlying political support for judicial power suggests
that the Supreme Court even during reconstructive presidencies does not "thwart the will
of a majority of the representatives"
in at least
one elected branch of the national government.
At the very least, a majority in at least one
elected branch of the national government has
368
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historically thought government
by judiciary
more attractive politically than presidential authority to determine constitutional meanings.
Reconstructive
presidencies
in their pure
form may also be a relic of the American constitutional past. Skowronek (1993, p. 443), who
developed the presidential typology that structures Political Foundations, suggests "discarding the idealized reconstructive
catharsis as a
premise for leadership." In his view, presidents
have less and less capacity to transform the
constitutional
order as the political system becomes increasingly fragmented and rival political actors develop independent
power bases.
"The greater security of institutions and political actors throughout the system," Skowronek
(2008, pp. 114-15) observes, presently "seems
to encumber the ambitions of reconstructive
leaders." The Reagan Revolution was blunted
in part by entrenched
understandings
of judicial power, but also by entrenched
Democratic majorities in the House of Representatives that easily parried assaults on their allies
in the federal judiciary. Should the "waning of
political time" (Skowronek 1993, p. 407) continue and government institutions grow "ever
thicker" (p. 413), the probability increases to
a near certainty that opposition political leaders will maintain enough control over at least
one elected branch of the national government
to prevent reconstructive presidents from fully
wresting authority over constitutional meaning
from the courts.J udicial decision making under
such conditions of political fragmentation
will
raise democratic problems, but these problems
are not well captured
ian difficulty.

by the countermajoritar-

Black and Blue
Black and Blue: African Americans, the Labor
Movement, and the Decline of the Democratic Party
details some of the democratic problems with
politically constructed judicial review. Frymer's
(2007) fascinating study of the relationships between the civil rights and labor movements
during the second half of the twentieth cenmry successfully challenges both the consensus

view in political science (i.e., Rosenberg 1991)
that courts cannot bring about significant social change and the consensus view in the legal academy (i.e., Chayes 1976, Fiss 1979) that
courts are desirable agents for significant social change. His path-breaking scholarship provides a far more nuanced understanding
of the
role litigation plays in American political and
constitutional
development.
Judicial decisions
matter, but for reasons that confound scholars
and policy activists. Supreme Court decisions
do not "thwart the will of the representatives
of the people of the here and now" as Bickel
thought, but make a greater contribution
to
policy incoherence than legal scholars suspect.
Frymer's story begins with African Arnericans seeking entry to labor unions. Entry was
desirable because labor unions in the early to
mid-New Deal order promised members both
economic security and political power. Entry
was problematic because desegregation
pitted
white workers who were staunch members of
the Roosevelt coalition against persons of color
who were giving an increasing share of their
vote to Democrats. Leading New Dealers and
proponents ofthe Great Society sought to avoid
politically painful choices by established separate governing regimes. "By the 1960s," Frymer
(2007, p. 3) explains, "instead of one national
labor policy, the federal government had two,
each with its own regulatory agency, its own
understanding
of workplace politics, and ultimately very different understandings of democracy." The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) was given responsibility for determining labor policy. Federal courts were empowered to determine civil rights policy.
Elected officials, Frymer's research concludes, authorized courts to mediate between
labor and persons of color. Political liberals on
both sides of the aisle self-consciously foisted
civil rights issues onto the federal judiciary
during the 1960s by expanding access to the
courts, authorizing the Justice Department
to
sue on behalf of African Americans, and providing special incentives for lawyers litigating
claims of racial discrimination.
Senator Hugh
Scott spoke for legislative majorities

when he

declared, "Congress should encourage citizens
to go to court in private suits to vindicate
its policies and protect their rights. To do so,
Congress must insure that they have the means
to go to court and to be effective once they
get there" (quoted in Frymer 2007, p. 86). Liberal representatives
had previously sharply improved federal judicial capacity to manage complex litigation. Black and Blue points out how
Congress during the 1940s and 1950s authorized legal elites to take numerous steps that
would make adjudication an attractive means
for making policy. "[E]lected officials," Frymer
(2007, p. 76) asserts,
delegated
greatly

power

expand

to judges

and

legal institutions,

igation a more appealing

lawyers
making

to
lit-

political strategy for

civil rights groups. The reform of the rules of
federal civil procedure

at this time resulted

a number

advances. It expanded

of important

the opportunities
standing

in

for civil rights groups to gain

and access to a judge; expanded

the

entry points at which civil rights groups promoted

creative

legal interpretations

reforms to venue and jurisdiction;

through
made it eas-

ier for civil rights plaintiffs to "discover"
aging evidence

of discrimination;

dam-

gave judges

the power to create "special masters"

to over-

see and implement

court orders; and gave the

judges

influence

far greater

their remedies,

particularly

against resistant

discriminators.

in determining
financial,

to use

Few reforms were adopted with the civil
rights movement consciously in mind. Nevertheless, civil rights Iitigators took advantage
of the resources elected officials made available to politically empowered
federal courts
when discovering evidence of racism in unions
and fashioning
discrimination.

creative

remedies

for illegal

Frymer documents a seeming liberal success story. Contrary to Rosenberg (1991) and
others (i.e., Horowitz 1977), litigation secured
substantial social reform. Controversial judicial
decisions are implemented,
Black and Blue details, when judicial losers cannot rally sufficient
uiuno.annnalreoieios.orc
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pressure. As one reluctant labor lawyer informed his clients, "[W]e must face the fact
that unless we do what the law requires we
will be bled to death financially" (Frymer 2007,
p. 91). By the end of the civil rights era, Frymer
(2007, p. 94) establishes, "courts had successfully integrated large swaths of the American

union membership was accompanied by a significant decline in the size and influence of the
labor movement.'? Labor unions could be integrated only by means that weakened their
political and economic capacities. Judicial decisions that endorsed the legal claims of the
civil rights movement widened the political gulf
between union members and persons of color,
two vital liberal constituencies. Faced with liberal politicians unwilling to side with labor and
liberal justices who enthusiastically sided with
the civil rights movement, many white union
members turned to more conservative politicians for relief. Persons of color were the immediate beneficiaries of political efforts to channel
labor disputes to the courts, but white workers
who defected from the Democratic Party un-

labor movement."
Black and Blue scoffs at claims that democratic norms were violated when the federal ju-

wittingly empowered antiunion employers in
the long run. Republican Party electoral victories, made possible in part by a politically

diciary integrated

enfeebled union movement, "allowed Republican presidents to change the composition of the
NLRB, leading to the overturning of dozens of

political support and those decisions impose
substantial financial burdens. Federal courts
during the 1960s mandated enormous fines for
past discrimination,
which attracted lawyers to
civil rights causes and threatened to bankrupt
racist unions. The result was a good deal of litigation, a good amount of compensatory damages, and a good deal more integration
than
existing models suggest litigation capable of
achieving. Unions caved under the financial

unions. Persons of color sued

for damages under statutes passed by Congress,
Congress enabled them to bring suit by loosening standing rules and providing attorneys'
fees for lawyers, and the resulting lawsuits were
typically decided by justices placed on the federal bench in part because of perceived sympathy with the civil rights movement (Frymer
2007, pp. 76, 86; Gillman 2006). The postNew Deal constitutional
order suffered from
democratic deficits, but not because justices
had policymaking responsibility. Frymer (2007,
p. 133) maintains,
"All branches
of the
American state-electoral,
administrative,
and
judicial-are
fundamentally flawed in their ability to effectively represent the will of the public." Judicial policymaking in civil rights cases
alleviated some of these democratic deficits.
"Democratic equality will often necessitate action by those who are less directly representative to the public," Frymer (2007, p. 130)
declares, "because they have incentives to represent both minority and majority groups that
are unable to represent themselves effectively."
Nevertheless,
the litigation campaigns that
desegregated
unions had unanticipated
costs
for persons of color. In Black and Blue Frymer
(2007, p. 2) details how "[tjhe increase in black
370

Graber

labor doctrines which ... are ... critical to the
massive decline in union power" (Frymer 2007,
p. 4). Federal court decisions favoring persons
of color more directly damaged unions. Judicial orders mandating integration
often took
"broader powers away from unions ... , powers
that were often critical to union power such as
seniority and hiring autonomy" (Frymer 2007,
p. 97). Thus, when facilitating black entry into
labor unions, liberal justices undermined labor
unions as a vehicle for black economic and political power. This subversion of union power
was not wholly unintended. Civil rights litigation was often sponsored by lawyers with little
interest in protecting the interests of workers.
"The use of corporate lawyers to fight union
racism," Frymer (2007, p. 7) claims, "often
served the dual agenda of expanding civil rights
and ... weakening the chief opposition to free
market capitalism."
The judicial decisions that integrated

unions

raise important normative questions about the
role of courts in a constitutional
democracy
other than the countermajoritarian
difficulty.
Frymer's primary concern might be labeled the

coherence difficulty. The federal judiciary and
the NLRB were entirely separate institutions
whose decisions on labor relationships
were

rehensible and unacceptable in any context."
Given the past history of discrimination
in
unions, that workers would make some racial

not coordinated by any more central agency.
The consequence
of this fragmentation
was
that judicial decisions promoting integration
often undermined NLRB rulings thought vital for maintaining union capacity to advance
the concerns of working people. "U.S. national
labor policy" by "divid[ing] labor and race into
separate forums," Black and Blue explains, fostered "conflict instead of intersection" (Frymer
2007, p. 9). Supreme Court policymaking in
the civil rights era al~o presented polarization
difficulties. Justices managing the integration
of unions worried more about which party
made better legal arguments than about satisfying all important constituencies. Frymer (2007,
pp. 136-37) points out that "[u]nlike regulatory agencies that are designed to reach compromises between antagonist interest groups,
courts tend to provide 'winner-take-all'
outcomes that benefit individual litigants." The
very possibility of achieving the "full loaf"

appeals during union elections is hardly surprising or unhealthy (Frymer 2007, p. 119).
Accountability difficulties might be added to
this list of concerns with judicial power in a

(Warren 1977, p. 6) through litigation inhibited
bargains between workers of different races, all
of whom would have benefitted in the long term
by mutual concessions.
Black and Blue concludes by demonstrating how judicial policymaking raises bias difficulties. Which governing institution resolves
political controversies matters, even when no
available decision-making
process is more rnajoritarian than the alternatives. Frymer points
out that justices trained in law often reach different decisions than other governing officials
who rely on different decision-making
logics.
His examination of disputes that arose during labor elections finds that courts were more
inclined to see any racist remark as raising
questions about the legality of prounion campaigns, whereas administrative
agencies were
more concerned with the underlying racial politics. In sharp contrast to "federal court decisions
under antidiscrimination
law," Frymer (2007,
p. 110) writes, "racism in labor law is regulated for its potentially damaging political consequences, and not because it is considered rep-

constitutional democracy. Elected officials who
divert political controversies to the courtroom
mask their responsibility
for the ultimate judicial decision. "When legislators shift divisive
social issues to the judicial branch because they
want to avoid electoral accountability for making hard choices," Lovell & Lemieux (2006,
p. 144) point out, "their actions raise significant concerns about democratic accountability." A regime characterized
by "the simultaneous operation, or intercurrence,
of different
political orders" (Orren & Skowronek 2004,
p. 17) presents additional accountability difficulties when citizens cannot determine what
institutions are responsible for offensive policies and what political actions are necessary to
bring about desired reforms. Patchwork states
promote pluralism (see Peretti 1999), but also
privilege elite interests by making the coordinated action necessary to secure social reform
exceptionally difficult (Graber 2001).
Whether politically constructed judicial review presents distinctive accountability, coherence, polarization, and bias difficulties is contestable. Legislators who sought to achieve
the Great Society by facilitating litigation did
not escape the wrath of voters. White workers who blamed liberal justices for integrating their unions abandoned the Democratic
Party in droves during the late 1960s and afterwards (Frymer 2007, p. 4; Greenberg 1996).
Coherence
was a problem with numerous
New Deal and Great Society policies that
farmed policymaking
responsibilities
out to
separate institutions with different constituencies, whether or not courts were involved (Lowi
1969). Frymer (2007, p. 14) recognizes that
"multiple agencies, created at different times
to address different problems, ... all attempting to address the same issue in fundamentally
different ways, ... working at cross-purposes
WWW.fl1l1.l1lfli1"evi£.W.f.01·g.TbeCo.ll1lter.JJlfljoritfirifl1l

Difficulty

371

and producing inefficient and conflicting policies" are a common
feature of "American
state building." Justices are quite frequently
accused of inhibiting legislative compromises
(see McCloskey 2005) when the only compromise elected officials are able to reach is to
transfer policymaking responsibilities to courts
(Graber 2006b, pp. 33-35). Parties may run to
the courtroom because justices are more willing to make controversial constitutional
decisions than elected officials, not because they
are seeking to avoid bargaining with political
rivals. That both union members and persons
of color might have benefitted in the longer run
by greater legislative accommodation
does not
entail that elected officials acting without the
possibility of judicial review in the background
could have reached a satisfactory arrangement.
Generalizing about judicial biases from one set
of legal decisions handed down at a particular time is always problematic. Federal courts
staffed by legal liberals exposed to critical race
theory (see, i.e., Delgado 1995, Matsuda et al.
1993) in law schools during the 1980s and 1990s
might have been more sensitive to the political
dimensions of racist speech than liberal justices
educated during the heyday of the American
Civil Liberties Union. The polarizing tendency
of courts may also have been rooted in the legal
liberalism of the civil rights era rather than in
more enduring judicial tendencies. During the
period from the New Deal to the Great Society,
constitutional politics was structured by centrist
parties and polarizing courts. When students of
American politics at the turn of the twenty-first
century complain about polarization and democratic deficits, their target is typically elected officials and the elected branches of the national
government.

THE COUNTERMAjORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY REVIVED
Students
of Congress
and the presidency,
without ever citing Bickel, are increasingly
identifying countermajoritarian
difficulties in
American electoral politics. American politics,
research

insists, is not the pluralist

bazaar de-

picted by the previous generation of political
scientists (i.e., Dahl 1961), in which almost
all major social interests are accommodated
to
some degree. Electoral politics in the United
States suffers from severe democratic deficits.
Abandoning inherited concerns with whether
centrist parties could produce coherent policies (Am. Polito Sci. Assoc. 1950), scholars at
the turn of the twenty-first century worry that
polarized parties are adopting platforms that fail
to resonate with average citizens. The Constitution, prominent works (Dahl 2001, Levinson
2006) insist, aggravates the countermajoritarian
tendencies of contemporary American politics.
Article I undemocratically
skews public policy
by mandating equal state representation
in the
upper chamber of the national legislature, Article II vests too much power in an insufficiently
accountable executive, and Article V prevents
popular majorities from adopting more democratic governing institutions.
The political construction of judicial review
places these democratic failings in a different
perspective than the countermajoritarian
problem. Bickel and his followers compared and
contrasted courts and legislatures as democratic
fora. Most concluded that Congress was the superior site for majoritarian policy (i.e., Ely 1980;
Choper 1980, pp. 4-59) but some (i.e., Shapiro
1966, pp. 17-26; Peretti 1999) disagreed. This
contrast is inappropriate when elected officials
empower courts to secure political goals. What
needs to be explored and evaluated is the democratic propriety of various quasi-alliances between the justices and at least some members
of the dominant electoral coalition. Superficial
examination suggests politically constructed judicial review sometimes aggravates and sometimes compensates for democratic deficits in
other institutions. If, for example, an off-center
president and malapportioned
Senate are both
more conservative than most voters, then justices nominated by the president and confirmed
by the Senate will increase polarization tendencies in American politics. If, however, an
off-center president is more conservative than
the general public and a malapportioned
Senate is more liberal then the general public, then

courts may actually improve the democratic
performance of governing institutions.

The Countermajoritarian Difficulty
with Congress and the Presidency
Polarization is the buzzword for describing
contemporary American politics. Both Republicans and Democrats are more united internally than at any other point in history and more
distinct from each other (McCarty et al. 2006,
pp. 23-24). Liberal Republicans are extinct.
Conservative Democrats are high on the endangered species list. Polsby (2004, p. 154) details a
"movement away from a long-standing conflict
between the two majorities, congressional and
Democratic, and toward a situation in which the
main competing coalitions have been effectively
mobilized by each of the two dominant parties."
"Conservative and liberal," McCarty et al. (2006,
p. 3) state, "have become almost perfect synonyms for Republican and Democrat." The parties are also polarized on more issues than ever
before. Carsey & Layman (2005, p. 1) detail the
process of "conflict extension" in the United
States. Racial and foreign policy issues had historically crosscut the New Deal party system.
At present, they note, "the parties are sharply
divided on all of the major policy dimensions
in American politics: economic and social welfare issues, racial and civil rights issues, cultural
issues such as abortion and gay rights, and defense and foreign policy issues."
This partisan polarization does not reflect
any underlying polarization of the general electorate. Prominent social scientists insist that no
fundamental change has recently taken place in
public opinion. Fiorina et al. (2005, p. 8) declare, "[T]here is little evidence that Americans'
ideological or policy positions are more polarized today than they were two or three decades
ago." The cultural war, in their view, is fought
almost entirely by a small class of partisan activists. Americans appear to hold more extreme
positions than they actually do because on election day they are offered only the choice between two relatively immoderate parties. "Even
if they still are centrists," Fiorina and coauthors

(2005, p. 114) complain, "voters can choose
only among the candidates who appear on the
ballot and vote only on the basis of the issues
that are debated." Other prominent political
scientists insist that polarization in the citizenry
is more widespread. Abramowitz & Saunders
(2005, pp. 4-5) found that "partisan polarization has increased considerably over the past
decade," and "is not confined to a small group of
leaders and activists." Nevertheless, they agree
that parties are far more polarized than the general electorate. Although they find "sharp divisions between supporters of the two major
parties that extend far beyond a narrow sliver
of elected officials and activists," Abramowitz
& Saunders (2005, p. 19) acknowledge
that
"most Americans are moderate in their political views."
This polarization is having important policy consequences.
Some political reforms are
being stifled by gridlock. "[P]olarization
in
the context of American political institutions,"
McCarty et al. (2006, p. 3) assert, "now means
that the political process cannot be used to
redress inequality that may arise from nonpolitical changes in technology, lifestyle, and compensation practices." More surprisingly, political extremists in the Republican Party have
successfully navigated the polarized political
universe and made much of their political vision
of the law of the land. Conventional
political
science models predict that polarized politics
should nevertheless generate centrist policies,
as the few remaining centrists in each party
control the political agenda (Hacker & Pierson
2006, p. 2). Moving off an unpopular veto point
is difficult, but whatever movement takes place
should be toward the center. Political conservatives are defying what was thought to be this
first law of political thermodynamics.
American
politics moved considerably during the Bush
administration, but that movement has been to- .•
ward the extremes rather than the center.
Hacker & Pierson (2006) document the partisan, countermajoritarian
consequences
polarization is having on contemporary
politics.
Their Off Center: The Republican Revolution &
the Erosion of American Democracy explains why
urunn.mrntmlreuietus.oro
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constitutional and political protections for centrist politics no longer function in the United
States. "[O]urvaunted
system of representation
has shifted off center," they declare, "and ... the
normal guardians of democratic accountability have not been up to the task of bringing it
back" (Hacker & Pierson 2006, p. 69). Conservative Republicans have combined aggressive
organization, enormous financial support, and
deceptive political advertising to produce economic programs that most Americans oppose.
Federal courts play only a bit role in this powerful indictment of the contemporary
Arnerican regime. Hacker & Pierson (2006, pp. 106,
190) briefly note that "since 1994, the Court
has been striking down federal laws at an unprecedented rate" and complain that such decisions as Buckley v. Valeo (1976) inhibit desirable
campaign finance reform. What Off Center relentlessly details is how contemporary political
parties and elected officials, the very institutions
and persons thought to guarantee a majoritarian centrist politics, now in practice facilitate
increased rule by affluent minority extremists.
American politics is presently structured by a
"stark disconnection
between the public and
elites" (Hacker & Pierson 2006, p. 223), but that
division is between voters and partisan leaders
rather than between elected officials and unelected justices.
Polarization in the United States, Hacker &

Pierson 2006, p. 29).
The increased conservatism of the Republican Party does not correspond with any increased conservatism in the general electorate.
No prominent study demonstrates any general
rightward trend in public attitudes. Hacker &
Pierson's (2006, p. 40) analysis of the political science literature asserts that "one is hard
pressed to find any evidence that Americans are
markedly more conservative today than they
were in the recent (and even relatively distant)
past." Public opinion research finds no increase
in support for particular Republican policies.
When asked at the onset of the Bush administration what should be done with the surpluses
gained during the Clinton administration, overwhelming majorities advocated new spending
programs (Hacker & Pierson 2006, pp. 50-51).
Instead, Republicans passed a major tax cut that
mostly reduced the tax burdens of the wealthiest Americans. That tax cut, Hacker & Pierson
(2006, p. 50) maintain, is an egregious instance
of countermajoritarian
policymaking. "Americans," they assert, "didn't think tax cuts were
particularly important in 2000 and in 2001,"

general public than they were when Richard
Nixon was president (Hacker & Pierson 2006,
p. 27). The average Republican in Congress is
now far more conservative because very con, servative Republican representatives
have replaced less conservative Republican representatives. The average Democrat
in Congress

they "didn't want to spend massive sums on tax
cuts, nor did they want the tax cuts to benefit
the rich disproportionately"
(p. 50).
Off Center contends that counterrnajoritarian policymaking is being enabled by almost
every trend in American politics. "The cords of
accountability have weakened," Hacker & Pierson (2006, p. 17) forcefully argue, "because the
electoral map has sorted into safely Republican
and Democratic districts," "because of rising incumbency advantage," "because of the growing
importance of money in the electoral arena,"
"because of the growing inequality of resources
and organization between the rich and the rest,"
and "because of the deliberate efforts of political elites to make it hard for Americans to know

is only slightly more liberal because conservative southern Democrats were replaced by
very conservative southern Republicans. Republican representatives
from Midwest states

what they are up to." Rising economic inequalities are the main villain in this political morality
tale. Hacker & Pierson (2006, p. 114) cite and
endorse studies finding that "congressional

Pierson document, is largely a consequence of
dramatic increases in the conservatism of Republican elites. Republican Party leaders over
the past generation have become far more conservative than the general public. Democratic
Party leaders are no more liberal than the
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vote more conservatively than they did 30 years
ago, but Democrats from New England vote no
more liberally than during the 1970s (Hacker &
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voting and public policy are more responsive
to the opinions of high-income
citizens than
poorer voters" (McCarty et al. 2006, p. 73).
Money skews Republican
and Democratic
priorities in different ways. Off Center notes,
"[W]hile both parties have felt compelled to
mobilize higher-income
citizens, the Republicans have found the goal much more consistent
with their aims" (Hacker & Pierson 2006,
p. 115). Affluent Republicans
aggressively
promote economic policies that skew benefits
to the most fortunate
Americans.
Affluent
Democrats,
by comparison,
have some tendency to "blunt] ] the traditional
populist
rhetoric of the party" (Hacker & Pierson
2006, p. 115). Hacker & Pierson (2006, p.
171) point out, "Important
elements of the
standard Democratic
agenda, especially on
economic issues, coexist awkwardly with the
realities of contemporary
political finance,
which require that Democrats
seek support
from deep-pocketed
business contributors.t"
Their need for the enormous sums necessary
for contemporary
political campaigns helps
explain why Republicans in office are more
committed to redistributing
resources to the
affluent than the average Republican
voter
and Democrats in office are less committed to
redistributing resources to the poor than is the
average Democratic voter.
Controlling
the national government
and
possessing the wherewithal to flood the media
with their interpretation
of political events,
affluent conservatives consistently confuse the
public about legislation that has actually been
passed and executive policies that have been

2 Affluent

Democrats

seem more inclined

to be social liber-

als than economic liberals. Thus, the Clinton administration
promoted off-center policies on matters such as partial-term
abortions, while adopting center, if not center-right,
economic policies (Graber

1997, pp. 731-33).

Similarly,

Repub-

licans have not successfully implemented
their social agenda
because "[i]n contemporary
politics, opposition to conservatives on cultural and social issues is intense, organized, and
well heeled" (Hacker & Pierson 2006, p. 195). Indeed, contemporary American politics might be characterized
as structured by a conflict between affluent citizens who fight to the
death for off-center economic policies, but cave on abortion,
and other affluent citizens who fight to the death for offcenter abortion policies, bur cave on tax policies.

implemented. Off Center details how "[cJontrol
of language and alternatives can be used to
frame discussions in ways that exploit voters'
lack of knowledge" (Hacker & Pierson 2006,
p. 67). Small benefits to average citizens are
front loaded, while substantial benefits to the
wealthy are phased in over time. "Republican
policy initiatives," Hacker & Pierson (2006,
pp. 158-59) assert, "have been designed in ways
that systematically place meager or doubtful
benefits for average Americans prominent in
the foreground while quietly showering the
bulk of their largess on the attentive and well
off." Ordinary citizens get their small tax cut
immediately.
Multimillionaires
obtain their
geometrically greater tax reduction over time.
So-called moderate Republicans win plaudits
from centrist voters by casting high-profile
votes against more extreme programs. They
win campaign
contributions
from affluent
conservatives by remaining silent when Republican House and Senate conference committees
quietly restore tax breaks and subsidies for the
most fortunate Americans (Hacker & Pierson
2006, p. 155). Not surprisingly, although the
more affluent minority that benefits from Republican programs are able to identify correctly
the provisions of crucial measures, surveys find
that average citizens consistently misperceive
crucial elements of legislation passed during
recent years (Hacker & Pierson 2006, p. 67).
The process by which conservative Republicans have secured unpopular
policies suggests a further challenge to Bickel's framing
of the countermajoritarian
difficulty. Bickel
recognized that some judicial decisions were
consistent with majoritarian judgments. "The
Court," he wrote, "represents
the national
will against local particularism"
(Bickel 1962,
p. 33). Nevertheless,
Bickel promptly added,
the Court "does not represent [the national
will], as Congress does, through electoral responsibility." Judicial policymaking is wrong,
in this view, because voters cannot hold lifetenured justices politically accountable for constitutional decisions popular majorities think
mistaken. Regime politics theory questions
this account, insisting that justices, or their
umno.anmmlreuiems.org
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political sponsors, are often more accountable
than Bickel realized (Peretti 1999). Richard
Nixon's campaign against the Warren Court
demonstrates that Americans are capable of reversing the trend of judicial decisions when they
are able to identify the political forces supporting unpopular rulings. Contemporary
students of public law (Lovell & Lemieux 2006;
Whittington
2007, p. 295) claim that judicial
review presents accountability
problems only
when politicians foist issues onto courts in ways
that obscure their responsibility
for the ultimate decision. Off Center recognizes that other
governing institutions suffer from this countermajoritarian/accountability
difficulty whenever
responsibility
for policymaking is difficult to
discern. Hacker & Pierson (2006, p. 17) remind
scholars, "For democratic competition to work,
voters need to be able to find out what politicians do and how it affects them." Americans
cannot hold conservative Republicans accountable for unpopular conservative policies, their
work claims, because they lack the information
necessary to vote their policy preferences ,1CCUrately. Politicians undemocratically
"run from
daylight" when they surreptitiously delegate issues to the courts, but also when they without
fanfare reduce workplace safety and environmental inspections, prevent the implementation of new rules, and fail to demand significant damages for legal violations (Hacker &
Pierson 2006, pp. 93-100). Policymaking
by
justices whose political sponsors are identified
may better promote political accountability, in
this view, than executive orders known only
to the most astute or compulsive observers of
American politics.

The Countennajoritarian
with the Constitution

Difficulty

American

also suffer from

electoral institutions

countermajoritarian
difficulties that are constitutionally built into the polity. That the Constitution contains various majoritarian failings is
hardly surprising. The persons responsible for
the Constitution
of 1787 were not unalloyed
majoritarians, and they scorned democracy, at
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least what they referred to as democracy.' Constitutional institutions were designed to "break
and control the violence of faction," which
Madison believed could consist of "a majority
or a minority of the whole" (Hamilton et al.
1961, pp. 77-78). Still, that the framers were
not majoritarian democrats is hardly a sufficient
reason for more enlightened
citizens to endorse countermajoritarian
practices at present.
Maintaining the Senate and the Electoral College seems particularly perverse. Dahl (2001,
pp. 31, 49), the preeminent
democratic theorist in the United States, asserts that the
"electoral
college ... grossly violate(s) basic
democratic principles" and that "the degree of
unequal representation
in the U.S. Senate is by
far the most extreme" in the world. Both constitutional mandates are countermajoritarian,
no
longer fulfill their original constitutional
purpose, arguably no longer fulfill any legitimate
constitutional
purpose, and privilege interests
with no special call on extraordinary
constirutional protection. The Senate and Electoral
College both, for example, augment the political power of white citizens at the expense of
persons of color (Dahl 2001, pp. 52-53; Lee &
Oppenheimer
1999, pp. 20-22).
Lee & Oppenheimer
(1999) elaborate the
undemocratic and unfair consequences of equal
state representation
in the Senate. A model of
political science inquiry, their Sizing Up the Sen-

ate: The Unequal Consequencesof Equal Representation demonstrates how the framing decision in
1787 to guarantee each state equal representation in one chamber of the national legislature
"leaves no aspect of the institution untouched"
(Lee & Oppenheimer
1999, pp. 224--25).
Senators from small states have personal
lationships with more of their constituents

re(p.

54), they are more likely to limit fundraising to
persons interested in obtaining particularized
benefits from the national government (p. 84),
and they are more likely to secure particularized

3 Dahl (200 I, PI'. 159-62) argues that the framers opposed
only direct democracy and generally favored modern representational democracy.

benefits for their constituents (p. 13). Equal
representation determines how federal funds
are distributed,
which partisan
coalitions
control the Senate, and how much power those
coalitions exercise.
Small-state senators are particularly adept at
bringing home the bacon for their constituents.
Senators from low-population states almost always secure state minimums, typically 0.5% of
the total funds allocated, whenever nondiscretionary federal spending programs are enacted
(Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, p. 205). Wyoming,
for example, receives far greater funding per
citizen than California for assistance to the
blind, even though no evidence exists that a
greater percentage of blind people reside in
Wyoming or that blind people in Wyoming require more financial assistance. Small-state senators earn this bonanza for their constituents
because senators with equal power naturally
seek to secure equal benefits. "A 'fair' distribution in the Senate," Lee & Oppenheimer
(1999, p. 163) detail, "is one that treats all senators 'equitably,' tending toward an equal allocation of funds across states." Senators from
low-population states also have greater capacity
to obtain additional funds for their constituents
as the price for supporting legislation. Because
they need fewer votes for reelection, relatively
small amounts of spending can secure the vote
of a small-state senator. As one commentator
noted, "[T[he small states are cheap dates" (Lee
& Oppenheimer 1999, p. 190).
Equal state representation structures nonspending policy by influencing the representational experience of senators, their capacity for
leadership, and the partisan balance in the upper
chamber of the national legislature. Senators
from low-population states are freer to champion controversial positions on more issues than
their peers from more populous states, Lee &
Oppenheimer (1999, p. 149) explain, because
their constituencies are more homogenous and
care about fewer issues. A North Dakota senator who increases agriculture subsidies may
be immune from electoral reprisal for taking
any plausible position in the contemporary war
on terrorism.

Senators

from low-population

states, who face fewer demands from their constituents, are also freer to seek Senate leadership positions. For the past40 years, Democrats
in the Senate have been led by representatives
from Montana, West Virginia, Maine, South
Dakota, and Nevada, even though the party's
base hails primarily from urban communities
(Lee & Oppenheimer 1999, p. 151). Most significantly, equal state representation affects the
partisan balance in the Senate. On some occasions, Lee & Oppenheimer (1999, pp. 11516) demonstrate, a different party would have
controlled the Senate had Americans been represented by population. More often, one party
gained 3-4 seats by taking advantage ofstrength
in small states. Interestingly, minority parties
tend to benefit more from equal state representation in the Senate than majority parties (Lee
& Oppenheimer 1999, p. 120). This contrarian
tendency may alternatively promote moderation, by empowering the most centrist members
of the majority coalition, or stasis, by facilitating filibusters.
Democrats and Republicans have both taken
advantage of equal state representation in the
Senate. Democrats were the beneficiaries of
this arrangement from 1914 to 1930 and from
1942 until 1958. Republicans have more commonly benefitted in recent years. Republican
control of the Senate during the Reagan (Lee
& Oppenheimer
1999, p. 115) and George
W. Bush administrations (Hacker & Pierson
2006, p. 36) was an artifact of the countermajoritarian constitutional rules for staffing that
institution. Had Senate seats at the turn of the
twenty-first century been allocated by population, the tax system in the United States would
be a little more progressive, the welfare system a
bit more generous, and Supreme Court justices
less conservative than Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito. Even if political coalitions based
in more populous states are neither consistently
liberal nor consistently conservative, a fair possibility exists that the politics of these jurisdictions have some common features. If, as Lee &
Oppenheimer so meticulously demonstrate, the
representative experience of a small-state senator differs dramatically from the representative
umno.nnnualreoieun.org
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experience of a large-state senator, then perhaps political movements that flourish in large
states have different characteristics than political movements that flourish in smaller states. At
the very least, their analysis helps explain why
New Deal Democrats were committed to providing subsidies for farmers, whereas Reagan
Revolution Republicans exhibited little interest
in ending that form of welfare.
State equality in the Senate is hardly the only
countermajoritarian
problem with the Constitution. When asked about a decade ago to
discuss the "stupidest" provision in the Constitution, the democratic populist law professor Mark Tushnet responded,
"The Whole
Thing."
His answer to that question was
"[rnjost of Article I, much of Article II, a
fair chunk of Article III, nearly all of AJ:ticle VI, and many of the Amendments,"
a response Tushnet concluded was "equivalent to saying, 'Article V'" (Tushnet 1995,
p. 224). Levinson's (2006) anticonstitutional
polemic, OZl1'" Undemocratic Constitution, provides a more comprehensive
attack on the
U.S. Constitution
as a legitimate foundation
for democratic government. His grand tour of
numerous constitutional
provisions that frustrate popular majorities concludes that "it is
increasingly difficult to construct a theory of
democratic constitutionalism
... that vindicates
the Constitution under which we are governed"
(Levinson 2006, p. 6).
Levinson focuses his sharp gaze on such constitutionally mandated procedures as the presidential veto. These clauses, whose language
is not subject to much interpretive flexibility,
prevent popular majorities from passing legislation, vest too much power in a relatively irresponsible president, and allow tiny minorities to
veto desperately needed constitutional reforms.
The result is a government prone to the lethal
combination
of poor performance
and poor
accountability. Although Levinson is a democratic majoritarian, he points out that consensus
democrats are no more likely to be happy with
contemporary
constitutional
practice. "Structural provisions of the Constitution,"
he details, "place almost insurmountable
barriers in
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the way of any acceptable notion of democracy"
(Levinson 2006, p. 6).
Our

Undemocratic

Constitution (Levinson
seven constitutional practices as "truly grievous defects."
These constitutional
abominations
are state
equality in the Senate, the lack of any constitutional provision for governance should a ter-

2006, pp. 167-68) describes

rorist attack disable most members of Congress,
the presidential veto power and absence of
clear limits on executive power during emergencies, the Electoral College and general
process for selecting the president, the relatively lengthy time period between the election and the inauguration of the president, the
limitation on impeachments
to "high crimes
and misdemeanors,"
and the supermajoritarian
requirements
for constitutional
amendment.
These constitutional
flaws all directly or indirectly promote countermajoritarian
government. The process for electing and removing
presidents enables persons to gain office without a popular majority and retain office for
years in the face of hostile popular opinion.
Article II, Levinson (2006, p. 117) bemoans,
vests "a noncriminal president" with "an unbreakable four-year lease on the White House"
(Levinson 2006, p. 117). The constitutional
rules for making laws offer minorities numerous veto points that are used to frustrate the
popular will. The presidential veto, in particular, is "just one more antimajoritarian
feature
of our Constitution that makes it ever harder to
pass legislation departing from the status quo"
(Levinson 2006, p. 44). Worst of all, the constitutional requirements
for amendments inhibit
all serious conversations
about constitutional
change. Levinson (2006, p. 21) notes how "Article V makes it next to impossible to amend the
Constitution
with regard to genuinely controversial issues, even if substantial-and
intensemajorities advocate amendment."
Judicial power is the least of Levinson's concerns. He does include "life tenure for Supreme
Court justices" under the heading "very real,
even if not so dangerous" constitutional
failings (Levinson 2006, p. 168). After noting that
the "formative adult experiences"
of elderly

Supreme Court justices "took place forty years
earlier in a society often unrecognizable
in the
present," Levinson (2006, p. 130) asserts, "[i]t
is one thing to elect such individuals to govern," but "another to have them govern because
elected individuals approved of them twenty or
thirty years earlier." Levinson does not, however, criticize judicial review practiced by a
court whose members serve 18-year terms or
by lower federal court justices whom he does
not object to serving for life (Levinson 2006,
p. 127). This last concession may be an oversight, given how rarely reviewed lower federal
court decisions often practically determine the
constitutional rights of the parties.

In ways he may not always acknowledge,
Levinson is a constitutionalist
and a democrat. Throughout
the book he calls for a new
constitutional
convention.
Our Undemocratic
Constitution never notes the possibility, suggested by Klarman (1997), that democratic populists should dispense with constitutionalism.
Levinson (2006) makes a sharp distinction between presidential vetoes on policy and constitutional grounds. He voices "no objection" to
the latter, "even if it is unclear whether the president in such circumstances should be allowed
the last word" (p. 45). How this distinction
might function in practice is unclear. If presidents did not have to defer to legislative judgments that a spending bill promotes the "general welfare" or that pollution regulations are
"necessary and proper means" for promoting
interstate commerce, then policy vetoes might
easily merge into constitutional vetoes. Regardless, Levinson seems to accept the notion of
some constitutional constraint on elected officials, even if elected officials are responsible
interpreting those constraints.

for

This populist mani festo ends on a remarkably antipopulist
note. Levinson (2006,
pp. 174-75) repeatedly condemns intellectuals
who are opposed to a new constitutional
convention as "being close to terrified of the passions of their fellow citizens" and exhibiting "an
utter lack of faith in the democratic potential of
our fellow Americans." He condemns as vigorously the overwhelming majority of Americans,

who credit the Constitution
of the United
States for American success (see Dahl 2001,
pp. 122, 141). When virtually all his students
defended a life-tenured judiciary on a final examination, Levinson (2006, p. 124) regarded
this "absolutely inexplicable ... commitment"
as a consequence of "the 'veneration' accorded
to the Constitution
and all of its aspects, however dubious they may be." High Federalists
could not have expressed their skepticism about
the political capacities of ordinary Americans
more succinctly.
Average citizens may express little interest in
a constitutional convention in part because they
suspect that the leaders in that convention will
not differ significantly from the persons playing leadership roles in contemporary
constitutional politics. Delegates selected consistently
with contemporary political practices may have
incentives to entrench polarization or the institutional foundations of that phenomenon.
Of
course, ordinary Americans might be wrong in
their judgments about the Constitution
or a
constitutional convention. If Americans may be
deluded about the Constitution,
however, perhaps they may have other delusions that are
perverting constitutional politics in the United
States. Perhaps, as Hacker & Pierson (2006)
suggest, those other delusions may be having
a more baneful influence on American constitutional politics than beliefs about the Constitution. Consider whether altering tlle Electoral College or abolishing the Senate would
prevent the propaganda that convinced many
Americans that Saddam Hussein was allied with
al Qaeda or confused voters about the impact
of recent tax cuts. Constitutional
culture, if
Hacker & Pierson are right, may need reforming before constitutional law and constitutional
courts can be successfully reformed.
Popular approval of both the Constitution
and judicial review cast doubt on whether either
is countermajoritarian.
The countermajoritarian difficulty and the democratic attack on the
Constitution
treat democracy as a strict function of popular support for particular policies or
for particular governing officials. Whether laws
against abortion pass democratic muster, in this
umnu.annualreoiems.org
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view, depends on whether a majority of Americans or a majority of elected representations
in the United States believe abortion should be
legally prescribed. Democracy, however, may
entail the people's right to choose governing
institutions, subject to important restrictions.
Particular majorities may not dilute the political
power of identifiable minorities. Most democratic theorists would not justify a constitution
that vested absolute power in 53% of the population that was supported only by that privileged

prehensive

53%. Constitutional
institutions supported by
overwhelming majorities, by comparison, may
be democratic, even when those institutions inhibit popular majorities, often for what seem to

izens, and are capable of being revised by popular acclaim. Judicial decisions that do not
present classic countermajoritarian
difficulties
may present coherence, polarization, and accountability difficulties. Politically constructed
judicial review that does not "thwart the will"

scholars to be dubious reasons. Levinson might
point out that Americans are not asked to vote
on the Constitution
or judicial review, though
arguably the nomination process for Supreme
Court justices provides a forum for debating
how the power of judicial review should be exercised. Still, given the overwhelming support
Americans seem to have for both the Constitution and judicial review, as well as their belief
that other issues are more important (Hacker
& Pierson 2006, p. 192), demanding scarce political time and resources be spent submitting
the Constitution and judicial review to a referendum might be, well, countermajoritarian.

THE COUNTERMA]ORITARIAN
DIFFICULTY REVISED
The countermajoritarian
difficulty suffers from
normative and institutional myopia. Bickel and
his followers focused obsessively on majoritarianism, ignoring other democratic problems
that may be aggravated or ameliorated by judicial decisions declaring laws unconstitutional.
Constitutional
commentators
reared on The
Least Dangerous Branch isolated courts from
other governing institutions, ignoring how judicial power is largely determined by decisions
made (or not made) by elected officials and is
unlikely to be responsive to reform efforts until presidents and members of Congress change
their behaviors. The works surveyed in this review provide foundations for the more com380
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institutional

and normative

analysis

necessary for creating and maintaining a constitutional democracy (Murphy 2007 is a model
of such analysis). Each study, in different ways,
examines how constitutions
structure interactions between governing institutions, often in
ways that help secure some democratic goods
at the expense of others.
Majoritarianism
is only one of many democratic commitments.
Good democracies seek
policies that are coherent, appeal to most cit-

of the people's elected representatives may undermine policy decisions made elsewhere in
the political system, antagonize crucial voting blocs, and obscure responsibility for policymaking. Politically constructed judicial review also presents bias difficulties. All forms of
political empowerment
structure public policy.
The Federal Reserve Board relies on different
decision-making metrics than the House Banking Committee.
The budget for the local library depends on whether funding is allocated
by the town council, the county board of supervisors, the state legislature, or the Congress of
the United States. Granting courts the power to
declare laws unconstitutional
similarly changes
political dynamics, privileging some political
interests at the expense of others (Hirschl 2004,
pp. 12-14; Graber 2006a, pp. 691-95). Judicial
review that passes democratic muster may nevertheless be undesirable if a different practice
would protect interests with a better claim to
political or constitutional solicitude.
Studies of the countermajoritarian,
coherence, polarization, accountability, and bias difficulties should be concerned with the performance of the constitutional system as a whole,
abandoning an "institutional partisanship" that
assumes "the centrality of the[ ] [particular]
institution"
being studied "in the drama of
American
politics" (Tulis 1987, pp. 9-10).
Whether
justices should behave consistently

with a predetermined
script depends
on
whether other political actors are behaving
consistently with their predetermined
scripts.
Judicial decisions
that in an ideal world
aggravate democratic
deficits may promote
democracy when the practical alternative is
gridlock or when elected officials publicly identify and take responsibility
for the judicial
choice. If, as Whittington
(2007) and Frymer
(2007) maintain, presidents and national legislators frequently have powerful incentives to
foster judicial policymaking, judicial behavior
is likely to be reformed only when elected officials have greater inducements for making constitutional decisions on their own. If, as Hacker
& Pierson (2006), Lee & Oppenheimer
(1997),
and Levinson (2006) claim, elected officials can
no longer claim the mantle of democratic legitimacy, resolving the most important countermajoritarian difficulties in American politics
requires serious political and constitutional reform, not better constitutional interpretation.
The resulting constitutional
theories are
likely to be more complex than those generated
by the coun termajori tarian difficul ty. Bickel and
his followers assumed that judicial decisions
declaring laws unconstitutional
were inherently
countermajoritarian.
dicial review presents
herence, polarization,
difficulties varies by

In practice, whether jucountermajoritarian,
coaccountability, and bias
case and is often con-

testable. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was

more polarizing tl13tPlanned Parenthood v. Casey
(1992). Casey presented greater accountability
difficulties than Brown, given that Republican
judicial appointees supported the constitutional
right to abortion. The judicial decisions desegregating labor unions made civil rights lawmore
coherent and labor law less coherent. Whether
justices have a special capacity to "listen to
voices from the margins" (Fiss 1989, p. 255)
or privilege affluent interests (HirschI 2004) is
a matter of debate.
The countermajoritarian
and other difficulties are not for law professors only. How courts
respond to constitutional
conflicts is largely
structured by electoral politics. That electoral
politics, in turn, is often wracked with countermajoritarian, coherence, polarization, accountability, and bias difficulties is partly rooted in
constitutionally
mandated procedures. These
democratic deficits require rethinking basic institutional practices in the United States and are
largely immune to constitutional law. Work on
the political construction of judicial power facilitated fruitful dialogues on the role of the judiciary in a constitutional
democracy between
academic lawyers and political scientists who
taught public law. As the countermajoritarian
and other difficulties continue migrating from
the courts to the Congress to the constitutional
culture, the time has come to bring students
of American and comparative politics into the
conversation.
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